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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
The application of the proximate cause doctrine appears sound, although the
Court ignores the argument that foreseeability of an intervening agency does not
relieve the first negligent actor from liability,20 apparently on the ground of public
policy.
Obstruction of Handrail Held to Be No Negligence
Under somewhat unique facts the majority of the Court denied recovery to
plaintiff who sustained serious injury resulting from falling down three steps in
defendant's store.30 The negligence complained of was that the defendant so
placed a vending machine as to partially obstruct the handrail on the stairway.
Plaintiff contended that the presence of the rail was an implied invitation to
grasp it, and her inability to do so caused her fall. Without citing any authority
the majority held, the placing of the vending machine was not negligence, nor was
there an implied invitation to use this partially obstructed railing when three
other stair lanes equipped with handrails were open for plaintiff's use.
In Hall v. Holland, " a recent Florida decision, the Court announced the
rule that the owner of property is bound to use reasonable care as to an invitee by
inspecting the premises and by either making them safe or providing adequate
warning to his visitors of the existence of a dangerous condition. However, "the
owner can assume that the invitee will perceive that which will be obvious to an
invitee on ordinary use of the invitee's senses," therefore vitiating the necessity
of warning as to the obvious dangers.
The dissenting opinion in the instant case asserted that it was well within
the province of the jury to find that the placing of the vending machine in such
a position created a "potential danger" to the patron of defendant's store, which
justified recovery. As authority for the proposition that a handrail not extending
the full length of the stairway was a "dangerous" condition they cited Hovey v.
State,2 2 where plaintiff was descending a flight of stairs which were not illumi-
nated and utilized the handrail to guide her descent. Analogous to the instant
situation, the handrail did not extend the full length of the stairway, which caused
the plaintiff's faiL
It is difficult to accept the reasoning of the dissenters, since it was the latency
of the danger occasioned by the lack of illumination which was the proximate
29. In Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N. Y. 345, 197 N. E. 306
(1935), it was held that the consequences brought about by a foreseeable inter-
vening independent force does not break the chain of causation so as to relieve
the primary actor from liability.
30. Aucoclo v. Neisner Brothers, 308 N. Y. 41, 123 N. E. 2d 630 (1954).
31. 47 So. 2d 889 (1950).
32. 261 AppA -Div. 759, 27 N. Y. S. 2d 195 (3d Dep't), aff'd 287 N. Y. 663, 39
N. E. 2d 287 (1941).
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cause of the injury in the Hovey case. The danger there was not perceivable by
use of plaintiff's "ordinary senses," whereas in the instant case the partially
obstructed handrail by its obviousness offered warning of any potential danger,
which is all the law demands.
Duty Owing to Licensee
In Jesselson v. Moody,33 defendant's employee accommodated plaintiff by
driving him in defendant's automobile to the airport, without the express direction
of defendant. En route plaintiff incurred fatal injuries resulting from the
employee's negligence. In a wrongful death action against the employer the
Court held, plaintiff was a mere licensee, to whom defendant owed only the
obligation of refraining from committing acts wantonly or wilfully injurious.34
The New Jersey courts have not recognized as sufficient for purposes of
recovery in this type of action the fact that plaintiff was riding at the invitation of
an employee;35 rather, proof is required that plaintiff was an invitee of the
owner. 3 6 Under New Jersey common law, the duty of the owner of a motor
vehicle to a licensee is said to be analogous to that owed to a trespasser by a
property owner 37 In order for the doctrine of respondeat superior to justify
recovery in these instances, the driver must not only be acting within the scope of
his employment in driving the car, .but must also be acting in furtherance of his
master's business in transporting the guest 38
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law §59 covers this type of suit by stating
that the owner of a motor vehicle shall be deemed liable for injury caused by
anyone legally using the vehicle, whether in pursuit of the owner's business or
otherwise. In addition New York Insurance Law§109 provides, inter alia, that all
contracts of insurance are to include under the liability coverage any personal or
property damage caused by the named insured or his permittee. Thus the two
enactments considered together evince the New York legislative policy preference
for a broader risk distribution 9 than was possible under common law auspices.
33. 309 N. Y. 148, 127 N. E. 2d 921 (1955).
34. Struble v. Bell, 126 N. J. L. 168, 17 A. 2d 800 (1941).
35. Yanowitz v. Pinkham, 111 N. J. L. 448, 168 AtI. 770 (1937).
36. Consent of the owner of an automobile may be express or Implied In
New York, in determining his liability for damages inflicted by his permittee.
Fuege v. Couder4 244 N. Y. 393, 155 N. E. 686, oreargument denied, 245 N. Y.
539, 157 N. E. 849 (1927).
37. Cowan v2. Kaminow, 128 N. J. L. 398, 26 A. 2d 258 (1942). Heinemann v.
Jewish Agr. Soc., 178 Misc. 897, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 354; afI'd, 266 App. Div. 907, 43
N. Y. S. 2d 746 (4th Dep't 1942).
38. Yanowitz v. Pinkham, supra note 35.
39. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 YALE L. J.
584, 720 (1929); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L. J. 106 (1916).
